Based on recently available archival materials, I argue that the popular image is misleading. The attitude and policy of the VCP toward nationalism was much more complex than commonly understood. While being genuine patriots, Vietnamese communist leaders frequently condemned nationalism as a bourgeois ideology while viewing national and class interests as being one and the same. In their propaganda, the VCP mobilized both nationalist and internationalist symbols to create popular loyalty to the Party. Since  when its Soviet patron collapsed, the VCP has turned to China for guidance and protection. Hà Nội's close relationship with Beijing out of ideological loyalty and regime survival instincts has naturally put the Party at great odds with widespread anti-China popular sentiments that the new nationalist movement thrives on.
Understanding the historical relationship between the Party and nationalism is essential to deciphering the discourse of the new movement. Under Party leadership since the s, the image of the Vietnamese nation in popular imagination has become mystified by its supposed exceptional beauty and unique people. To channel popular loyalty to the Party, state propaganda has also tied the fate of the nation to socialism and to VCP rule. Note that nationalist goals (independence and unification) were mentioned first and followed by ideological goals (socialism), but the emphasis was really on the latter. It is wrong to deny that Vietnamese communist leaders were patriots, but it would be equally wrong to assume that they thought of socialism simply as an instrument to solve the national problem. Nguyễn Tất Thành emphasized that he wanted a complete revolution that would achieve both goals, not just the national one. In the minds of Hà Huy Tập, Lê Hồng Phong, and Trường Chinh, national liberation was simply the appearance, while class struggle was the heart of the revolution. Phạm Văn Đồng's formula that equated patriotism with building socialism made patriotism serve socialism, not vice versa. In Lê Duẩn's view, socialism was both the means and the end.
The third pattern was that Vietnamese communist leaders made conscious efforts to mobilize both patriotic and internationalist sentiments.
North Vietnamese propaganda suggested a mixture of internationalism and nationalism with the former more emphasized than the latter, at least up to the mid-s. From  to , for example, the most frequently published authors in North Vietnam were Lenin (forty titles), Stalin (twentynine titles), Mao (twelve titles) and Hồ Chí Minh (eleven titles).  The higher percentage of lessons with political contents reflected a more politicized society due to the war. The higher number of lessons about communist heroes was due to the protracted war that had produced a longer list of heroes. The wars these heroes and heroines died for were framed as a struggle for both patriotic and internationalist goals. Significantly, the lessons about unification were now three times more than those about socialist brothers. At the same time, the number of lessons on general patriotism (two) and historical heroes (one) remained the same.
With massive and systematic efforts devoted to propaganda,  Hà Nội leaders skillfully molded public imagination in such a way that the ethnically-based Vietnamese nation became totally identified with the VCP and its mission to battle imperialism and build socialism together with the difficult today is because the devils are still occupying our country."  In her thoughts, the war was in the true interest of her country whose imagined future could not be anything but socialism.
After unification, the Party continued to mobilize patriotic sentimentsthis time under the "constructing socialism and defending the socialist fatherland" banner. Soon Vietnam was back at war with Cambodia and China in -. Again, Vietnamese leaders framed these two wars in terms of national independence and ideological principles:
Until today some Westerners still maintain that [the Sino-Vietnamese conflict] was "a war between communist countries," [and that] it is evidence that "conflict over national interests overshadows ideological unity among socialist countries." That's not true! . . . the Sino-Vietnamese war in February  was not a conflict among communists, but essentially a fierce struggle between national independence and socialism on the one hand and aggression, expansionism, and chauvinism on the other, between Marxism-Leninism on the one hand and Maoism on the other.  However, grave economic problems and the late s collapse of the Soviet bloc outweighed the threat posed by China and Cambodia. In response, the Party abandoned central planning and opened up the economy for Western trade and investment. Vietnam also normalized relations with the U.S. and joined many international and regional organizations. Notwithstanding the shift to a market economy, Hà Nội rejected any significant political reforms. It restored relations with Beijing and continued to pledge its loyalty to socialism.  In public, Hà Nội pledged to be friends of all countries even as Vietnamese leaders still evaluated foreign relations through an ideological lens. At the special midterm Party Congress in , the VCP's politburo issued the following remarks:
In international relations, [our policy] "to be friends of all nations in the world community" is designed to take advantage of shared interests . . . with other nations . . . within the framework of "collaborating while struggling" . . . In order to build socialism and defend our fatherland, we place friends in different categories, with some closer than others. By their nature, our long-term allies are the socialist countries, the communist and worker parties, and movements for national independence and revolutionary/progressive causes. We affirm solidarity and mutual support with those forces and movements through clever and adaptive [linh hoạt] measures that are suitable to objective conditions and to our own and our friends' subjective capacity.  In this spirit, victories against France and America continue to be proudly commemorated while the Party seeks to erase the - Sino-Vietnamese conflict from public memory.  By the early s, market reforms brought Vietnam not only significant economic growth but also deepened social inequality, religious tension, and ethnic unrest. Labor strikes and farmer protests against land grabbing by state officials intensified. In response, VCP leaders formulated a new "strategic line" aimed at building "great national solidarity [đại đoàn kết dân tộc] based on the alliance of workers, peasants, and the intelligentsia under the leadership of the Party."  This new line aimed to counter certain pernicious "hostile forces" (read: Western powers) that "use 'democracy, human rights,' ethnicity, and religion to divide the Party, the State, and the people."  It appears that the leadership still hoped that the people would continue to identify the nation with the Party. That hope would soon be put to test by three important events during - discussed in the next section. These events foreshadowed the emergence in  of the first ever anti-China demonstrations in communist Vietnam.
The thoughts and practices of Vietnamese communist leaders thus followed complex but identifiable patterns. They heaped scorn on nationalism as a bourgeois ideology and viewed national and class interests as one and the same. They sought to mobilize patriotic and nationalist sentiments, but even during times when such sentiments were emphasized they did not neglect the internationalist dimensions of the revolution. Significantly, Vietnam was not distinct from other communist states in these aspects. Recent studies based on new archival sources have dispelled the myth that nationalism was suppressed in the Soviet Union, China, and Eastern Europe.  The VCP's complex relationship with nationalism helps explain the politics of nationalism in Vietnam today. On the one hand, the Party's consistent ideological loyalty and its dependence on China for support since the s suggest the reason why it is hostile toward the anti-China nationalist movement. This movement threatens Hà Nội's cozy relationship with Beijing and challenges the Marxist-Leninist ideology on which that relationship in part is based.  On the other hand, the Party's success in mobilizing patriotism popularized many myths and provided it with significant nationalist credentials. As will be seen, the discourse of the movement has largely focused on questioning those myths and credentials.
The Birth of a Spontaneous Nationalist Movement
The birth of the new movement can be traced to three events that took place during -. These events did not cause the movement but together they signaled the arrival of a nascent political civil society with broad geographical spread and social links that challenge the VCP on a wide range of issues.  In January , Chinese Coast Guards killed nine Vietnamese fishermen and arrested several others in the Gulf of Tonkin. Not since , when Chinese warships sank Vietnamese ships and seized several of the Spratly Islands, had such bloodshed occurred. Yet the Vietnamese government remained silent and issued a diplomatic complaint only six days later, after a local newspaper had leaked the news. This event sparked many anti-China protests by the Vietnamese diaspora, but what was really unprecedented was the move by Vietnamese graduate students studying abroad to form a group to condemn China's "brutalities" and express sympathy with their "compatriots." This group raised donations for victims' families, collected signatures for letters to be sent to Chinese embassies worldwide, and founded a website to publish relevant information and analyses. Their manifesto highlighted "respect for humanity" and denounced "violence," but made clear that the group was not interested in promoting revenge or Vietnamese hatred against Chinese.  The second critical event was the founding of the " bloc" in April  by a group of  people that included Catholic priests and other religious leaders, teachers, doctors, writers, other professionals, and several retired military officers.  Among the leaders of this bloc was Father Tadeo Nguyễn Văn Lý, who had been in and out of prison in the previous two decades for anti-government activities. The bloc denounced communism and called for multi-party democracy and the protection of basic freedoms and human rights in Vietnam. Never before had such a large number of people from across all three regions of Vietnam gathered for such a venture. Also unprecedented was the fact that the group existed for several months before its leaders were arrested. The government moved cautiously in this case because it feared international sanctions. So much was at stake as Mười and Politburo member Nguyễn Đức Bình defended socialism and argued that the nation's future was still tied to it.  Nguyễn Đức Bình was particularly against the idea that Party members would be allowed to engage in commercial pursuits and entrepreneurial activities because that meant exploitation. Their opponents, by contrast, called on the Party to take bolder steps in economic and political reforms. Some argued that the Party should abandon Marxism-Leninism and place "national interests" above ideological principles. Others advocated more effective laws, checks and balances in the political system, intellectual and press freedom, respect for international norms of human rights and democracy, and even toleration of opposition parties.  While Chinese brutalities and popular discontent posed serious challenges to the VCP, the boom in social media in the mid-s offered activists a new tool for horizontal mobilization. Besides violent crackdowns, the government is known to have set up firewalls and employed tens of thousands of security personnel to monitor online communication, hack into blogs and websites, and defend the government in spontaneous online discussions.  Yet government suppression failed to stem the growth of the movement. In summer , hundreds of protesters marched in Hà Nội for eleven Sundays. They were reacting to the incident involving the cutting of seismic cables of Vietnamese ships by Chinese boats in areas claimed by Vietnam. The protests attracted people from many social strata and across various age groups. Many former government officials and well-known writers and scholars also joined. All except the first protest were confronted by a large security force, which threatened protesters' families, encircled their houses on Sundays to prevent them from leaving, and arrested them on site. Many protesters were severely beaten, fired, expelled from school or from their apartments, and placed under police investigation or detention for weeks. Bùi Thị Minh Hằng, one of the most vocal, was singled out to be sent to a detention center for prostitutes for nearly one year. Still, such violence did not prevent demonstrations in , , and .
A notable development for the movement was the birth of the "bauxite group" as an influential voice in the rapidly flourishing virtual networks of the Vietnamese educated public. In , when it was reported that Chinese companies had been given licenses to exploit mineral and forest resources in many strategic locations in Vietnam, three intellectuals founded boxitvn.net, which published critical analyses of state-sponsored bauxite mining projects and collected thousands of signatures for a petition against those projects. 
The bauxite group grew due in part to support from an influential group of public intellectuals and former technocrats such as Hoàng Tụy, Chu Hảo, Nguyễn Trọng Vĩnh, Nguyên Ngọc, and Nguyễn Quang A. Some members of this group are retired high-ranking officials who had served as cabinet members or as advisors to former Prime Ministers Võ Văn Kiệt and Phan Văn Khải. They are public intellectuals mostly loyal to the Party who have benefitted from market reforms and who no longer depend on the government for a living. However, Prime Minister Nguyễn Tấn Dũng turned down their service when he succeeded Phan Văn Khải. This group reacted by establishing in  the Institute for Development Studies (IDS), a quasiprivate think tank under whose name they issued many analyses and comments critical of Nguyễn Tấn Dũng's policies. The  issuance of Decree no.  banning all research institutions from making public criticisms of government policy forced IDS to dissolve or face legal consequences.
Since then, the website has published numerous critical analyses of government policies and submitted petitions on a wide range of issues, including policies toward China, territorial disputes in the South China Sea, nuclear power and high-speed rail projects, human rights, constitutional reform, and legal restrictions on the press and Internet freedom. Although the new nationalist movement in Vietnam is young, it has embraced a broad agenda that links national independence to economic, social, and political reforms. That agenda reflects the deep and complex problems facing Vietnam after two decades of market reform without corresponding political reform. As a result, Vietnam now lacks effective political institutions to sustain economic growth, while powerful special interests benefitting from the status quo have joined forces to block necessary political reforms.  Sociologically, the emergence of the bauxite group suggests that market reform has created a more independent intelligentsia who, paradoxically, are increasingly marginalized by the regime. This intelligentsia is joining forces with former enemies and long marginalized "fellow travelers" of the VCP in promoting political change. These are the currents that powered the nationalist movement.
The perceived threat from China no doubt ignited the protests, but in addition to triggering age-old Vietnamese patriotism as commonly interpreted,  those acts also exposed the VCP's vulnerabilities, particularly its ideological dependence on China and its program of "market reform with socialist orientations." Market socialism has helped the VCP retain power and privileges following the collapse of the Soviet bloc. At the same time,
A NT I -CH I NA NATIONA L IS M I N C ONTEM POR A RY VIETNAM
that formula compels the Party to remain close to China for ideological support. Market socialism has also made it difficult for Vietnam to quickly and deeply integrate its economy into a global economy dominated by the capitalist West.  As the Chinese economy rose to become the world's second largest economy, the much weaker and smaller Vietnamese economy has unsurprisingly been pulled into China's orbit.  As will be seen below, protesters were enraged not only by Chinese acts in the South China Sea but also by the VCP's dependence on China, which they saw as having disastrous consequences for Vietnam's national interests.
Movement Discourse
Interacting closely with anti-China street protests are massive online traffic in comments and debates. In the virtual discourses about the nation, activists strive primarily to debunk myths about the Vietnamese nation and to rescue its history from the Party's grip. At stake are not only the Party's nationalist credentials on which its legitimacy rests but also the quest for new visions of the nation.
D E B U N K I N G M Y T H S A B O U T T H E N A T I O N
Confronted by the colonized status of their nation, many Vietnamese nationalists in the early twentieth century sought to construct a glorious precolonial past in which their nation had enjoyed great wealth and freedom. In the process, they helped create or popularize national myths about
Vietnam's exceptional beauty and wealth and certain unique qualities of Vietnamese such as diligence and heroism. Vietnamese communists have also contributed to the myth-making enterprise in their own way. Statements such as "our country is rich and beautiful; our people are heroic" and "our country has golden forests and silvery seas" have been taught to children of many generations and have become clichés.  During the civil war, the VCP expended considerable resources to construct myths of the Hùng kings as the founder of the Vietnamese nation today.  Stories of "heroic" struggles against and "glorious" victories over foreign invaders saturated textbooks and propaganda. Of course, Party leaders never failed to stress that, while the Vietnamese nation was built on an ethnic base, the mandate had been passed to the VCP and that socialism was now the chosen path for Vietnam Since the Eighth Central Committee Plenum in May  in Pắc Bó with the decision to establish Việt Minh to gather [anticolonial] forces, the Party . . . has always raised the slogan of struggle against foreign invasion. Until today the Party has never dropped that flag but always tied the nation's famous struggles against foreign invasion to the leadership of the Party. Moreover, the Party assumes the authority to define which country in the world is a "foreign invader" . . . or "precious friend" . . . regardless of whether that foreign country is friendly, useful, hostile, or inimical to national survival and territorial integrity. . . . The historical development of the VCP since  shows that, externally the Party has been quite flexible in its tactics, including making concessions, turning foreign enemies into friends or vice versa. But since the Party took power, it has never shown any thoughts of collaboration or made compromises in dealing with other Vietnamese who hold different political views. Half a century ago, the Politburo and the Central Committee of the VCP dreamt of an international proletarian paradise in which people with Chinese or Vietnamese nationality were not much different. [They sincerely believed that] China took the Paracels only to hold those islands for Vietnam, and that was better than letting the Americans occupy them. This sounds funny today but it is the truth. The VCP is deeply indebted to the Chinese Communist Party. . . . To excavate the  note by Phạm Văn Đồng [today] is for the young generation to see the real face behind the mask of "national liberation" of the VCP leadership. The Party has kept quiet about [the note] not because it cannot think of solutions such as those I have proposed above, but because the note is a symbol for the nationless [vong bản] belief of a generation of communist leaders who are now idolized in Vietnam. . . . The Party dares not to publicly disown the note because doing so would amount to admitting its idiocy [u mê] and its traitorous, antination nature.  As Hồ Chí Minh and Phạm Văn Đồng go down in the new nationalist history as disloyal and even traitorous to the nation, Phan Châu Trinh is rehabilitated for his conception of the nation not simply as an ethnic community but also as an enlightened and democratic one. Long dismissed by communist historians for not being revolutionary enough, Phan Châu Trinh now enjoys great admiration among writers and activists as being much more far-sighted than Hồ Chí Minh. Mai Thái Lĩnh, a former deputy mayor of Đà Lạt who has contributed the most to reintroducing Phan Châu Trinh's ideas to contemporary readers, argues that Phan Châu Trinh preferred a nation that opened up to the world to one that was insular.  Phan Châu Trinh also supported socialism but rejected communism.
R E C O N S T R U C T I N G N A T I O N A L H I S T O R Y A N D I D E N T I T Y I N D E P E N D E N T O F T H E P
Phan Châu Trinh's conception is now widely accepted by those at the forefront of the movement even though they express it in slightly different ways. Nguyễn Gia Kiểng, for example, defines the nation as "a shared space for people who jointly endeavor to bring prosperity and pride to all."  For people to be prosperous and proud of their nation, respect for human rights and democracy-"mankind's general values"-are necessary. For Nguyễn Gia Kiểng, the ethnic core is important but not adequate for a nation to survive in the twenty-first century; continuing survival requires it to accept the values of the global community.
A similar view is found among Vietnamese from different backgrounds.
An example is Anh Ba Sàm (pseudonym of Nguyễn Hữu Vinh), son of a former Vietnamese ambassador to the Soviet Union and once a member of the public security apparatus. In the manifesto of his popular basam.info, Ba Sàm declares that his blog aims to "break the shackles of slavery" [phá vòng nô lệ].  Citing Phan Châu Trinh's teaching that a people would forever be enslaved if their minds remained uneducated, Ba Sàm explains that, by "slavery," Phan Châu Trinh meant not just a nation being enslaved by foreign countries but also a government enslaved by its own ignorance and a people enslaved by an oppressive government.  Besides self-rule, democracy and enlightenment also constitute Ba Sàm's concept of an ideal nation.
A more radical concept of the nation is found in Phạm Hồng Sơn's writings. In thinking about a basis for solidarity which is necessary for collective action, Phạm Hồng Sơn dismisses patriotism as being too narrow and susceptible to manipulation: "Not only is patriotism limited to people within certain borders but evil forces may also manipulate patriotism [for evil purposes]." The best foundation for solidarity to Phạm Hồng Sơn is not patriotism but respect for human dignity or human rights:
[H]uman dignity cannot be separated from basic human rights, including the freedom of thought, freedom of speech, [and] the freedom to publish. . . . If human rights serve as the basis of solidarity, such solidarity can bring people out of the narrow realm of friends, families, parties, and nations into a vast and harmonious world.  Demystifying the nation and reconstructing national history have preoccupied most spokespeople of the new nationalist movement because they must confront decades of state-led nationalism that has bound the nation to the Party. To win over skeptics, activists must dispel the myths and distorted history long spun by Party propagandists. For activists like Tống Văn Công, Lê Hiếu Đằng, and Phạm Đình Trọng, whose lifelong careers were built inside the Party, separating the nation from the Party is as much a personal struggle as it is a civic act.
Conclusion
This paper has examined the new nationalist movement in Vietnam, a recent and still fragile phenomenon that has survived government suppression so far. Despite the lopsided struggle against a powerful police state,  movement participants have generated a vibrant discourse that seeks to demystify the nation, reconstruct its history autonomous from the Party, and propose new concepts of the Vietnamese nation.
The politics of nationalism reflects deep grievances in contemporary Vietnamese society that result from the particular mixture of market reform and authoritarian politics. Market reforms have created independent intellectuals and professionals while authoritarian politics marginalizes them. The "market socialism" Vietnam has followed for two decades is now reaching a bottleneck where fundamental reforms of the political system are required to sustain growth but powerful interests are blocking such reforms. In addition, market socialism has tied Vietnam to China politically and economically. Vietnam's increasing dependence on China at a time when China acts aggressively in contested territories places the dilemma of national survival squarely in front of various disaffected Vietnamese groups and launches them on a quest to search for a new national identity.
Even though only a few hundred participants have written blogs and joined street protests, popular blogs that carry the nationalist movement in the virtual world have attracted perhaps a hundred thousand regular readers.  The movement is fostering a new, if only mostly virtually expressed, consensus across a broad spectrum of Vietnamese inside and outside Vietnam for fundamental reforms, especially political reforms. The movement is reconciling Vietnamese who were once ideological enemies but are now uniting in the face of an aggressive China and a Vietnamese government perceived as meek and corrupt. At the same time, the politics of nationalism stands to divide the communist party into those who are either ideologically committed or benefitting from the status quo, and those who want change for the sake of the nation. As the VCP seeks to maintain good relations with China, it is gambling away its remaining This historical relationship explains why the Party has tried to suppress the movement and why movement discourse strives to debunk national myths and reconstruct national history. Linking national interests to democracy and human rights, the currently fragile movement is creating dissent within the Party and damaging its legitimacy.
